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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
N atu re Of The Case 
Lloyd Hardin McNeil appeals from his convictions of voluntary manslaughter, first 
degree arson, and grand theft. On appeal, he contends that his voluntary manslaughter 
conviction is not supported by the evidence, that some of the prosecutor's unobjected-to 
comments during closing argument constitute fundamental error, and that the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A little after noon on March 5, 2011, Boise police and firefighters responded to a 
house fire at 1209 S. Lincoln Ave. (PSI, p.2.) Observing black smoke, the firefighters 
forced entry into the home and extinguished the fire. (Id.) After removing a smoldering 
mattress from the home, firefighters found a badly burned body lying dead on top of the 
box spring. (Id.) The body was later identified as Natalie Claire Davis. (ld.) 
Police commenced an investigation. Fire Investigator Captain Thomas Gainore 
concluded that the fire was intentional, noting that cooking oil had apparently been 
poured on top of the mattress. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Subsequent reconstructed tests of the 
scenario by the ATF Fire Research Laboratory produced similar fire patterns and 
supported Captain Gainore's conclusion. (PSI, p.3.) Forensic Pathologist Dr. Charles 
Garrison performed an autopsy on Natalie Davis which revealed that she died before 
the fire was set. (Id.) Though Dr. Garrison could not determine a precise cause of 
death, he did identify suffocation as the likely cause. (ld.) He noted that Natalie had 
elevated levels of alcohol and Benadryl in her system which, though not fatal, would 
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have incapacitated her and made it easy to stop her breathing. (ld.) Police also 
discovered that Natalie's car was missing, along with her two dogs. (PSI, p.2.) 
The evening prior to the fire, Natalie Davis reported a domestic disturbance, 
identifying the suspect as her ex-fiance and giving police the false name "Michael" 
McNeil. (PSI, p.2.) Police contacted Matthew Hess, Natalie's brother and roommate, 
who told them that the only people who lived at the house were Natalie, her boyfriend 
Loyd Hardin McNeil, and himself. (Id.) Mr. Hess reported that early on the morning of 
March 5th he was awoken by McNeil and Natalie fighting. (ld.) When he later left to go 
to work that morning, he saw McNeil sitting on the futon next to Natalie, who appeared 
to be asleep. (Id.) Natalie did not stir or speak to Mr. Hess. (Id.) 
Police issued ATL and BOLO alerts on both McNeil and Natalie's stolen car. (Id.) 
Later, Natalie's dogs were located in a "no kill" shelter in Dillon, Montana. (PSI, p.3.) 
The man who dropped the dogs off identified himself as "Tristan Loyd" and was 
accompanied by an unidentified female. (ld.) The man matched McNeil's physical 
description and subsequent photos confirmed that he was McNeil. (Id.) The woman 
was later identified as Amanda Pluard of Whitehall, Montana, who acknowledged 
accompanying McNeil to the shelter and also admitted pawning a ring for him. (PSI, 
p.4.) McNeil called Ms. Pluard as he drove to Montana, with the phone call originating 
in Boise and pinging off a cell tower in Glenns Ferry, about an hour after police and 
firefighters discovered the fire. (ld.) Receipts also confirmed that, only minutes before 
the fire was reported, McNeil had purchased gasoline within blocks of 1209 S. Lincoln 
Ave. (PSI, p.3.) McNeil left Natalie's car in Ms. Pluard's driveway. (Id.) Ms. Pluard told 
police that McNeil then took a bus to Seattle. (PSI, p.4.) 
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Police tracked McNeil to the Green Tortoise Hostel in Seattle where he checked-
in on March 10th. (PSI, p.3.) Michelle Valentin, an employee of the hostel, invited 
McNeil to stay at her place at 5803 8th Ave. NW. (Id.) On March 18, 2011, Seattle 
Police located McNeil on the 5800 block of 8th Ave. NW and arrested him on the 
fugitive warrant without incident. (Id.) 
The Grand Jury indicted McNeil with murder in the second degree, arson in the 
first degree, and grand theft. (R., pp.23-24.) McNeil stood trial. At the conclusion of 
the trial, the jury returned a not guilty verdict on the charge of second degree murder, 
but found McNeil guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (R., 
pp.256-57.) The jury also returned guilty verdicts on the charges of first degree arson 
and grand theft. (R., pp.258-59.) The district court entered judgment against McNeil 
and imposed on his conviction of voluntary manslaughter a sentence of 15 years fixed, 
on his conviction of arson in the first degree a consecutive sentence of 25 years with 10 
years fixed, and on his conviction of grand theft a consecutive sentence of 14 years 
indeterminate. (R., pp.261-63.) 
McNeil filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of sentence. (R., 
pp.283-92.) The district court denied the motion. (Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration Under ICR 35 (Augmentation).) McNeil filed a notice of appeal timely 
from the judgment. (R., pp.265-68.) 
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ISSUES 
McNeil states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support Mr. 
McNeil's conviction for vOluntary manslaughter? 
2. Were Mr. McNeil'S constitutional rights violated by the prosecutor's 
unobjected-to misconduct? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
combined sentence of fifty-four years, with twenty-five years fixed, 
following his convictions for voluntary manslaughter, arson in the first 
degree, and grand theft? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
McNeil's Rule 35 motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that McNeil was guilty of voluntary manslaughter? 
2. Has McNeil failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to appellate review 
of his unpreserved claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing 
argument? 





Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The JUry'S Conclusion That 
McNeil Was Guilty Of Voluntary Manslaughter 
A. Introduction 
The Grand Jury indicted McNeil on a charge of second degree murder. (R., 
p.23.) The state's theory of the case was that McNeil killed Natalie Davis with malice 
aforethought, as evidenced by his staging the arson, his delusional emails, and his 
stealing her things. (See Tr.,1 p.1060, L.5 - p.1082, L.10.) The defense argued that 
Natalie could have accidentally caused her own asphyxiation by mixing Benadryl and 
alcohol. (Tr., p.1083, L.13 - p.1084, L.17.) The jury, rejecting both theories, acquitted 
McNeil of second degree murder but convicted him of the lesser included offense of 
voluntary manslaughter. (R., pp.256-57.) On appeal, McNeil argues that there was 
insufficient evidence for a jury to convict him of voluntary manslaughter. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-13.) Even the most cursory review of the trial record, however, clearly 
demonstrates that the jury's verdict is consistent with and supported by the evidence 
presented attrial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288,292,955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
1 Citations to ''Tr.'' refer to the "Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings held on 1/30/12, 
2/15-22, 28/2012, & 4/16/12." Other transcripts are referenced by their date. 
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826 P .2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. Moreover, the facts, and 
inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. 
!.Q." In determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at 
trial, the Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without 
regard to its ultimate admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 
539 (Ct. App. 2010). 
C. The Jury's Verdict Convicting McNeil Of Voluntary Manslaughter Is Consistent 
With The Evidence Presented At Trial 
Voluntary manslaughter is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being ... 
without malice ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." I.C. § 18-4006(1). The 
evidence presented at trial clearly supports the jury's verdict convicting McNeil of 
voluntary manslaughter. 
Dr. Charles Garrison, working at the-Ada County Coroner's Office, performed the 
autopsy on Natalie Davis. (Tr., p.521, Ls.17-23.) While Dr. Garrison's examination 
could not determine a specific cause of death, Natalie's death appeared to not be 
accidental and he was certain that she did not die of natural causes. (Tr., p.536, Ls.1-7; 
p.559, L.19 - p.561, L.10; p.590, L.24 - p.591, L.10.) Toxicology reports showed that 
Natalie had elevated levels of alcohol and Benadryl in her system when she died. (Tr., 
p.533, Ls.5-23.) Dr. Garrison was able to determine, however, that these levels would 
not in and of themselves be lethal, whether alone or in combination. (Tr., p.533, LS.15-
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23; p.535, Ls.2-16.) Dr. Garrison's testimony also established that Natalie died before 
the fire was set (Tr., p.531, L.18 - p.532, L.25), that her body was covered in bruises, 
including large bruises on her chest (Tr., p.528, L.23 - p.530, L.4), and that her body 
was placed between the mattresses (Tr., p.542, L.3 - p.553, L.3). 
The only person to see or hear Natalie Davis before the fire, who also testified at 
trial, was her brother, Matthew Hess. Mr. Hess testified that he was awoken early on 
the morning of March 5, 2011. (Tr., p.618, Ls.7-14.) McNeil and Natalie were arguing 
loudly. (Tr., p.618, L.16 - p.619, L.7.) Mr. Hess also heard loud noises and banging, 
"like bang, bang, and then bang, bang." (Tr., p.619, Ls.8-15.) Then the arguing 
suddenly stopped and Mr. Hess tried to go back to sleep. (Tr., p.619, Ls.16-19.) 
A few minutes later, after Mr. Hess's alarm went off, he went upstairs to use the 
bathroom and found McNeil sitting on the futon with Natalie lying beside him. (Tr., 
p.621, L.17 - p.622, L.8.) McNeil told Mr. Hess that Natalie was asleep. (Tr., p.622, 
Ls.3-8.) Mr. Hess testified that Natalie appeared to be asleep. (Tr., p.622, Ls.9-10.) 
Mr. Hess, however, did not talk to her before going back to the basement. (See Tr., 
p.622, Ls.11-14.) About a half hour later, Mr. Hess again went upstairs to shower and 
found both McNeil and Natalie lying next to each other on the futon. (Tr., p.622, L.15 -
p.623, L.11.) After his shower, he again found them lying next to each other in the 
same position on the futon. (Tr., p.623, Ls.12-14.) They were not speaking to each 
other; both appeared to be sleeping. (Tr., p.623, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Hess did not talk to 
either of them. (Tr., p.623, Ls.2-3.) Rather, Mr. Hess returned to the basement, 
dressed, and went to work. (Tr., p.623, Ls.20-24.) 
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Not once did Mr. Hess actually speak to Natalie. There is no evidence that he 
ever checked to make sure she was asleep. He did not testify that she was moving, 
that her chest was expanding and falling, or that she made any noise at all. Mr. Hess 
only testified that Natalie appeared to be asleep, that she never moved from the futon, 
and that he never spoke to her. 
From this evidence, the jury could have drawn the reasonable inference that 
Natalie Davis died during the fight. She was not asleep lying on the bed; she was dead. 
McNeil feigned that she was asleep until he was alone in the house. He then gathered 
her property into her car, tried to dispose of her body by starting the fire, and fled. The 
evidence actually presented to the jury at trial is thus consistent with the theory that 
McNeil killed Natalie Davis in the heat of passion during the sudden quarrel that 
occurred in the early morning hours of March 5, 2011. Because the jury's verdict is 
supported by and consistent with substantial evidence, McNeil's claim that he must be 
acquitted despite overwhelming evidence that he killed Natalie Davis must be rejected 
and his conviction of voluntary manslaughter affirmed. 
II. 
McNeil Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Appellate Review 
Of His Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
McNeil argues, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct through unobjected-to comments he made during closing arguments, which 
McNeil claims amounted to fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-24.) McNeil 
has failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct much less fundamental error entitling 
him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
8 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeaL" State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental 
error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,978 (2010). 
C. The Prosecutor's Unobjected-To Statements During Closing Argument Do Not 
Constitute Misconduct, Much Less Fundamental Error 
Under the standard announced by the Idaho State Supreme Court in Perry, to 
establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
!sL at 226,245 P.3d at 978. McNeil has failed to meet this appellate burden. 
"Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the 
jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted). A 
prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct and in the 
context of the entire tria!." !sL (citations and quotations omitted); see also Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated 
in light of the defense argument that preceded it"). U[A] criminal conviction is not to be 
lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the 
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statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined 
whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the triaL" United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Application of these foregoing legal standards to the 
prosecutor's unobjected-to comments, viewing those comments in the context of the 
trial and defense counsel's argument, shows that the comments are not objectionable, 
much less that they constitute fundamental error. 
McNeil provides no context for the prosecutor's comments about which he 
complains and fails to acknowledge when and how the comments were made in 
response to defense counsel's closing argument. (See generally Appellant's Brief, 
pp.14-24.) Rather, he asks this Court to review the prosecutor's argument in isolation. 
Such an analysis is contrary to law because the context is critical to understanding the 
statements and to the Court's determination of whether the prosecutor's conduct 
affected the fairness of the trial. Darden, 477 U.S. at 179; Young, 470 U.S. at 11; 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440. 
McNeil claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to 
fundamental error by twice indirectly commenting on his silence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-19.) The state acknowledges that prosecutors are not allowed to comment on a 
defendant's silence as evidence of his guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 
(1965). McNeil's line of argument, however, must fail on the second prong of Perry, 
because an indirect comment cannot be clear on the face of the record. 
The first comment, that the scene was staged and "[t]here has been no testimony 
other than that" is clearly a comment on the evidence, not the defendant's silence. Dr. 
Garrison testified, in his expert opinion, based on a cigarette having been placed into 
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Natalie's dead mouth and Natalie's body having been placed between the mattresses, 
that her death scene was staged. (See Tr., p.560, L.24 - p.561, L.5.) While that 
testimony could have been contradicted by other expert testimony, it was not. Pointing 
out that Dr. Garrison's expert testimony was not rebutted is not misconduct. 
In the second statement, that Natalie Davis was dead before the fire was set and 
"there is a small window there nobody can really know except the defendant. He's the 
only person who lived through it," it is not at all clear that the prosecutor is commenting 
on McNeil's failure to take the stand. That McNeil lived through the fire and, being the 
last person to see Natalie alive, was the only one who was present for the small window 
of time at the end of her life, is incontrovertible. Testimonial evidence established that 
McNeil was left alone at the house with Natalie on the morning she died. (See Tr., 
p.621, L.17 - p.623, L.22.) The prosecutor's comment on that evidence relates to 
opportunity, a major element in any murder trial, and recognizes that McNeil had a 
window of opportunity in which to kill Natalie Davis. 
McNeil next claims that the prosecution sought to inflame the jury by telling it that 
"[Natalie] was a helpless victim, helpless adult, like a baby." (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20 
(quoting Tr., p.1079, Ls.9-10).) In the context of the trial, this comment is not 
inflammatory; it is descriptive. Natalie Davis died of asphyxia, yet did not have petechial 
hemorrhages. (Tr., p.585, Ls.1-5.) Dr. Garrison explained that, as a rule, where there's 
compression of the vessels (as in strangulation), you find petechial hemorrhages. (Tr., 
p.584, Ls.12-16.) However, when someone is incapable of fighting back, such as a 
baby, then petechial hemorrhages are absent. As Dr. Garrison explained: 
You can suffocate someone with a pillow, simply if they are 
incapacitated. If it's an adult and they can't fight back, then they will die. 
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If it's a baby, they can't fight back in any event, so you don't see [any 
petechial hemorrhages]. 
The adult, if they are capable of fighting back, can and will. If they 
are not, and they are incapacitated, then your findings are nothing. You 
don't see anything unless you've got some element of injury, and most of 
the time you don't. 
(Tr., p.585, Ls.6-16; see also Tr., p.594, L.13 - p.595, L.5.) Toxicology examinations 
showed that Natalie Davis had elevated levels of alcohol and Benadryl in her system. 
(Tr., p.533, Ls.5-23.) These drugs in combination, while not fatal, would have left 
Natalie incapacitated. (Tr., p.533, Ls.15-23; p.606, Ls.7-20.) The evidence thus 
supported the argument that Natalie Davis was incapable of defending herself, like a 
baby, which explained the lack of petechial hemorrhaging. 
McNeil next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he opened 
his rebuttal argument saying, "I guess they concede the grand theft." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.20-21 (quoting Tr., p.1095, Ls.17-18).) Accusing the prosecution of making a false 
claim, McNeil ignores what had occurred just moments earlier during the defense's 
closing. Literally, defense counsel conceded the grand theft: 
The State presented you with a lot of information about Hardin 
[McNeil]. He had a case pending in Montana against Natalie. He was 
leaving town in [Natalie's] Suzuki Vitara. It was full of Natalie's things. He 
had her dogs. He dropped them off at a dog shelter, gave a false name, 
used Amanda to pawn [Natalie's heirloom] ring. 
(Tr., p.1093, Ls.14-20.) Evidence presented during the trial showed that Natalie's 
heirloom ring alone was worth $4,450.00. (Tr., p.1030, L.16-p.1032, L.13.) Evidence 
also showed that McNeil instructed Amanda to pawn the ring for him. (2/23/2012 Tr., 
p.50, Ls.6-16.) Those facts are sufficient to establish grand theft. Acknowledging that 
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defense counsel conceded grand theft, where defense counsel in fact did, is not 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
McNeil, again ignoring the context of the statement, next argues that the 
prosecutor disparaged defense counsel's role by saying, "We want to hold people 
accountable when they murder someone, yes, but we don't want it to happen. We don't 
want to make it up. And he has to say that to try to get his client out of trouble." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.21-22 (quoting Tr., p.1098, Ls.1-5).) This quote illustrates why a 
prosecutor's statements must be viewed in the context of the defense's argument and of 
the trial. First, looking at the quoted material as offered by McNeil, it is not clear what 
the prosecutor is saying, much less that it constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
Second, in context, the prosecutor is not disparaging defense counsel's role; he 
is confronting defense counsel's argument. During closing, defense counsel accused 
the state of "clinging" to an "untenable" theory that Natalie's body was placed between 
the mattresses (despite the body being found there) "because that's how they get 
homicide." (Tr., p.1086, L.3 - p.1093, L.13.) Directly before McNeil's out-of-context 
quote, the prosecutor began his response by saying: 
This body being on top of the bed issue is dead by the time the 
mattress gets out the door, yet-and counsel says we have to have that 
because we want homicide? Really? We want murders? 
We want to hold people accountable when they murder someone, 
yes, but we don't want it to happen. We don't want to make it up. And he 
has to say that to try to get his client out of trouble. 
(Tr., p.1097, L.21 - p.1098, L.5.) In context, the prosecutor properly responded to 
defense counsel's argument that the state was motivated to view the evidence only in a 
way that supported a homicide conviction. The state has no such motivation. 
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McNeil, again ignoring the context of the statement, next argues that the 
prosecutor sought to inflame the jury when he said, "And that just because she was 
vulnerable and an easy target, it's no reason to let him get away with murder." 
(Appellant's brief, p.22 (quoting Tr., p.11 01, Ls.23-25).) This argument responds to 
defense counsel's misrepresentation of Dr. Garrison's testimony, which defense 
counsel used to argue that McNeil could not have suffocated Natalie Davis unless there 
were indicators such as petechial hemorrhaging and broken bones in her neck. (Tr., 
p.1083, Ls.1-12.) This argument ignores the testimony that those indicators are only 
present when an adult resists suffocation or is strangled, not in an adult who is 
incapacitated and cannot fight back. (Tr., p.584, L.6 - p.585, L.16.) As noted above, 
Natalie Davis, with her elevated levels of alcohol and Benadryl, was vulnerable and 
incapable of fighting back. (Tr., p.533, Ls.15-23; p.606, Ls. 7-20.) The external signs of 
struggle, therefore, would not be present. In context, the statement is not objectionable. 
Finally, McNeil argues that the prosecutor's attempt during closing argument to 
quote a Mark Twain maxim about the value of a person's last breath constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) Paraphrasing great American 
authors during closing argument is not prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Reynolds, 
120 Idaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991) ("the prosecuting attorney 
may resort to poetry, cite fiction, reference anecdotes, or tell jokes" during closing 
argument). Considering the evidence and theory presented by the state during the trial, 
the particular anecdote is in fact very well-suited: The state's theory of the case was 
that, in addition to trying to burn her house to the ground and stealing all her property, 
McNeil asphyxiated Natalie Davis; literally, he stole her last breath. Even out of context, 
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it is apparent that the prosecutor was arguing that McNeil killed Natalie Davis. The 
prosecutor is permitted to argue that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
stands accused. 
McNeil has failed to show that any of the comments he complains of for the first 
time on appeal amount to misconduct. He has therefore failed to establish a clear 
violation of his constitutional rights under Perry. Even if improper, he has failed to show 
that the arguments rise to the level of constitutional significance. Furthermore, in each 
of the complained of statements, McNeil has also failed to show that defense counsel's 
decision to not object during the state's closing argument was anything other than 
tactical. This is especially true in a trial where defense counsel in fact objected during 
the prosecutor's closing argument, and that objection was sustained. (Tr., p.1 098, LS.9-
11.) The record thus suggests that defense counsel would have objected if he deemed, 
tactically, that the challenged comments merited an objection. Finally, McNeil has failed 
to show that he was prejudiced by any of the statements which he chose not to object to 
below. 
McNeil has failed to establish that, when presented in the context of the trial and 
of defense counsel's closing argument, any of the prosecutor's statements constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct. McNeil failed to preserve review of this issue by timely 
objecting to any of the complained of statements below. On appeal, he has failed to 
establish fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
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III. 
McNeil Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
McNeil argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences of 15 years fixed on his conviction of voluntary manslaughter, 25 
years with 10 years fixed on his conviction of arson in the first degree, and 14 years 
indeterminate on his conviction of grand theft, or that it abused its discretion by denying 
his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-29.) McNeil has failed to establish an 
abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing Consecutive 
Sentences Of 15 Years Determinate Upon McNeil's Convictions Of Voluntary 
Manslaughter, 25 Years With 10 Fixed On His Conviction Of Arson In The First 
Degree, And 14 Years Indeterminate On His Conviction Of Grand Theft 
McNeil argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, his sentences are 
excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-28.) Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant is required to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State 
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 
Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, McNeil must show that his 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary 
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objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 
728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal, with the 
presumption that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term 
of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In 
deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable 
sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Considering the nature of McNeil's crimes, his sentences are not excessive. As 
the district court noted, the jury concluded that McNeil killed Natalie Davis. (Tr., p.1154, 
Ls.2-14.) Natalie's death was not an accident; it was a homicide. (Id.) But that is not 
all he did: After killing Natalie, McNeil then staged her body to make it appear 
accidental. (Tr., p.1155, Ls.7-11.) It was clear that Natalie was dead before the fire 
started. (Tr., p.1155, Ls.8-10.) McNeil placed a cold cigarette butt in her mouth so it 
looked as though she was smoking in bed. (Tr., p.1155, Ls.13-15.) He placed electrical 
items, which did not start the fire, near her body. (Tr., p.1155, Ls.16-17.) And McNeil 
hid her body between the mattresses. (Tr., p.542, L.3 - p.553, L.3.) 
The district court noted that McNeil's attempts to conceal his killing of Natalie 
Davis also showed an extraordinary disregard for others. (Tr., p.1155, L.18 - p.1156, 
L.5.) Had McNeil known to leave the bedroom door open, the whole house would have 
been engulfed in flame. (Tr., p.1157, L.24 - p.1158, L.2.) McNeil's reckless attempts to 
conceal his homicide are thus not only reprehensible in and of themselves, they also 
significantly endangered the lives and property of Natalie's neighbors. (Tr., p.1156, 
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Ls.1-5.) Firefighters and first-responders who entered the house to extinguish the fire 
were also placed at unnecessary risk by McNeil's actions. (Id.) 
And, as the district court noted, McNeil went even further, stealing all of Natalie 
Davis's earthly possessions. (Tr., p.1156, Ls.6-9.) McNeil came to Idaho in willful 
violation of a no contact order. (2/23/2012 Tr., p.29, L.21 - p.32, L.7) After killing 
Natalie, he stole her car to flee from Idaho to Montana. (2/23/2012 Tr., pA3, L.11 -
pA5, L.14.) He took her dogs and dropped them off at a "no kill" animal shelter. 
(2/23/2012 Tr., pA7, Ls.6-16.) Then he instructed another woman to pawn Natalie's 
heirloom ring so he could get money for a bus ticket from Montana to Seattle. 
(2/23/2012 Tr., p.50, L.6 - p.51, L.6.) He was on the run, and using the property of the 
woman he had just killed to finance his flight. 
On appeal, McNeil argues that his sentences are excessive because, at 31 years 
old, he is relatively young, the present felonies are his first convictions, he has the 
support of family and friends, and, while incarcerated, he was not a disciplinary 
problem. (Appellant's brief, pp.25-27.) None of these establish that McNeil's sentences 
are excessive. First, though McNeil's cumulative sentence has a unified term of 54 
years, only 25 years are fixed, allowing McNeil, if he proves amenable to rehabilitation, 
the eventual opportunity to reintegrate into the community. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 
170 P.3d at 391 (reviewing court presumes fixed portion of sentence will be the actual 
term of confinement). Furthermore, McNeil stole Natalie Davis's life and then tried to 
hide it by burning her house down, endangering the lives and property of her neighbors 
as well; ensuring that he serves lengthy terms for those dangerous crimes protects 
society and is not excessive. Second, though the present crimes are McNeil's first 
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felony convictions, they are not his first felony charges. (See PSI, p.16.) In fact, McNeil 
told Amanda Pluard that he came to Boise to "appease" Natalie Davis in the hope of 
influencing her testimony in his pending domestic violence case. (See 2/23/2012 Tr., 
p.63, L.11 - p.64, L.4.) Third, considering McNeil's parasitic nature, support from 
friends is suspect; even Natalie kept taking him back before he killed her. Finally, 
though McNeil may have performed well in confinement, while outside of prison he 
killed a woman, attempted to hide it by burning her house down, and stole all her things. 
His sentences are not excessive. 
Because McNeil has failed to show that his sentences are excessive, he has 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. The judgment of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied McNeil's Rule 35 
Motion For Sentencing Leniency 
McNeil argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by denying 
his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) If a sentence is within applicable 
statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, 
and the Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, McNeil 
must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." Id. McNeil 
failed to carry this burden. 
The additional information provided by McNeil in support of his motion for 
reconsideration showed that he had attended rehabilitative programming. (R., pp.289-
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92.) Over the course of 60 days, McNeil spent 162 hours attending courses focused on 
addiction recovery. (R., p.289.) In his motion for reconsideration, noting the concern 
expressed by the district court regarding McNeil's rehabilitative potential, McNeil argued 
that this information demonstrated that he was amenable to rehabilitation. (R., p.291.) 
The information provided by McNeil, however, does not address the district court's 
concern, which was based on the dearth of information presented at sentencing, such 
as any indication of remorse or acknowledgement of wrongdoing, due to McNeil's lack 
of participation in the PSI. (See Tr., p.1153, Ls.10-17; p.1158, Ls.10-16.) Furthermore, 
McNeil's programming does not address the public safety concerns underlying his 
sentences. McNeil was not convicted of a drug crime; he was convicted of killing 
Natalie Davis, attempting to burn her house down with her dead corpse inside it, and 
stealing all her earthly possessions. (R., pp.257-59.) McNeil's attempt to address his 
substance dependency, though positive, does not reduce the risk he poses to society or 
ameliorate the seriousness of his crimes. 
McNeil's attendance in courses addressing his substance dependency, while 
commendable, does not establish that his sentences are excessive. McNeil's 
sentences were reasonable when imposed, were reasonable when he filed his Rule 35 
motion, and remain reasonable now. Having failed to show an abuse of the court's 
discretion, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm McNeil's convictions and 
sentence. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of April, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
21 
